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Abstract 
This paper examines the disconnect between the literature on and practice of legality verification 
(LV) in the forest sector and what would seem to be a logical extension into the literature on and 
responses to forest crime and, more specifically, transnational criminality associated with the 
trade in illegally logged timber. The apparently logical overlap between these two areas of 
endeavour arises because both are dealing with aspects of supply chains or chains of custody 
involving raw timber, forest products or timber products more generally. The disconnect, I 
suggest here, arises because of a lack of ‘joined up thinking’ between the two themes that are 
central to forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG) - that is, enforcement on the one 
hand and governance on the other. The former is frequently perceived to be relevant mainly to 
issues of criminality and the development of coercive responses by the state, the latter to 
normative standards and rules for defining legality and implementing verification in which actors 
other than the state have assumed a substantial role. The second purpose of this paper, then, is 
to explore the role of ‘agents beyond the state’ in the spaces of transnational legality verification 
and forest law enforcement. It does so as an initial response to the call from Biermann et al ‘to 
document these various forms of governance through which actors exercise agency [beyond the 
state] and … to better understand the conditions for the emergence of agency at different levels 
and within different architectures.’  
Keywords: Forest management, legality verification, criminality, non-governmental organizations 
JEL classification: D18; F02; K32; K33; M14; L31  
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Legality, criminality and agency beyond the state: forest governance, illegal logging and 
associated trade2 
Lorraine Elliott 
Introduction 
The University of Oxford’s Environmental Change Institute defines forest governance as the 
way that ‘state and non-state institutions and actors shape decisions about the conservation and 
use of forest resources’.3 This paper does two things – admittedly both in a preliminary, ‘work in 
progress’ fashion – in an exploration of the way that legality, illegality and criminality feature in 
those decisions and practices of forest governance. First, it examines the apparent disconnect 
between the literature on legality verification (LV) in the forest sector and what would seem to 
be a logical extension into the literature on forest crime and, more specifically, criminality. It is 
notable that issues of criminality and law enforcement are rarely mentioned in the growing body 
of work on legality verification, most of which emanates from scholars and practitioners working 
in an environmental or forest management context. In a similar fashion, the literature on the 
criminal aspects of trade associated with illegal logging – what Interpol and UNEP call ‘black 
trade’ and which is mainly the purview of the law enforcement and border protection 
community of practice – rarely discusses legality verification standards and practices.  
The apparently logical overlap between these two areas of endeavour arises because both 
are dealing with aspects of supply chains or chains of custody involving raw timber, forest 
products or timber products more generally. While approaches to verification have focused on 
setting standards that can help to define legality and illegality, they have paid little attention to 
countervailing criminal efforts that seek to circumvent and violate domestic and international 
norms and challenge the authority of states and other private actors. The disconnect, I suggest 
here, may well arise because of a lack of ‘joined up thinking’ between the two themes that are 
central to forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG) - that is, enforcement on the one 
2 This paper draws on research being undertaken for a three year project funded by the Australian Research Council 
under its Linkage Grant program in partnership with the Australian federal Department of Sustainability, Water, 
Environment, Population and Communities (DSEWPaC). For more on this project, see Lorraine Elliott ‘Fighting 
transnational environmental crime’, Journal of International Affairs, 66(1) (2012): 87-104; Lorraine Elliott (2011) 
Transnational Environmental Crime: Applying Network Theory to an Investigation of Illegal Trade, Criminal 
Activity and Law Enforcement Responses, Australian National University 2011 (Canberra: Department of 
International Relations, 2011); and Lorraine Elliott (forthcoming) ‘Governing the international political economy of 
transnational environmental crime’ in Anthony J. Payne and Nicola Phillips (eds) The Handbook of the International 
Political Economy of Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing; in preparation). An earlier version of this paper 
was presented as part of a panel on Legality Verification in Transnational Environmental Governance at the 
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, April 2013 
3 http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/research/ecodynamics/forestgovernance.php (accessed 22 March 2013). 
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hand and governance on the other. The former is frequently perceived to be relevant mainly to 
issues of criminality and the development of coercive responses by the state, the latter to 
normative standards and rules for defining legality and implementing verification.  
This paper also accepts Cashore and Stone’s proposition that single instrument 
approaches such as LV are necessary but not sufficient to ‘ameliorate the multi-faceted nature of 
forest degradation’.4 From a policy and regulatory perspective, these challenges require more 
than just disrupting illegal supply through strengthening domestic legislation – normative change 
– and ensuring that forestry agencies have appropriate skills and technical capacity to enforce 
that legislation – material change. This paper argues that the focus on (il)legality and governance 
in the global forest sector must be supplemented and complemented with a focus on criminality 
and enforcement.  
The second purpose of this paper is to explore the role of ‘agents beyond the state’ in the 
spaces of transnational legality verification and forest law enforcement. It does so as an initial 
response to the call from Biermann et al ‘to document these various forms of governance 
through which actors exercise agency [beyond the state] and … to better understand the 
conditions for the emergence of agency at different levels and within different architectures.’5 
This paper focuses not on all non-state actors but specifically on non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) that work independently (beyond the state) as well as with agents of the 
state to address governance and enforcement challenges associated with the transnational timber 
trade and trafficking. While a role for NGOs has been widely accepted in LV procedures and 
standard-setting it has been more controversial in enforcement. This move from verification to 
enforcement raises more complex questions about the role of NGOs and ‘agents beyond the 
state’.  
 The lack of a clear international normative framework creates ambiguity about what 
constitutes legality and illegality in the global forest sector. This is not helped by the complexity 
of forest laws – often numbering in the hundreds – within individual timber producing countries. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to resolve those ambiguities. In the face of 
confusion about the substance of what is legal or not, the character of legality is understood here to 
apply to behaviour as well as to commodities or goods.6 Criminal behaviour is often defined in 
terms of the active evasion and violation of standards established by domestic and international 
                                                 
4 Benjamin Cashore and Michael Stone (n.d.) Can legality verification rescue global forest governance? Assessing the interacting 
effects of economic mechanisms on forest policy and governance: lessons learned from Southeast Asia, unpublished paper, p. 1 
5 Frank Biermann et al (2010) ‘Earth system governance: a research framework’, International Environmental Agreements, 
10 (4) 277-98 at pp. 283-4.  
6 Penny Green, Tony Ward and Kirsten McConnachie (2007) ‘Logging and legality: environmental crime, civil 
society and the state’, Social Justice, 34 (2): 94 – 110.  
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laws and regulations. This encompasses more than those actions that specifically attract criminal 
as opposed to civil or administrative penalties in law. Criminality can also be understood in 
sociological terms as deviancy, ‘subject to … social processes of censure and sanction’.7 In our 
transnational environmental crime project, the way we define criminal activities (again, the 
character rather than the specific content) is also informed by the UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime.8 The Convention refers to intentional offences against domestic 
(and by extension international) laws that are undertaken with the aim of obtaining financial or 
other material benefit. This includes organising, direction, aiding and abetting such offences; or 
dealing with the proceeds through money-laundering, or through converting, transferring or 
disguising the illicit origins of property that constitutes the proceeds of crime. These kinds of 
activities take on a transnational form when, in effect, the planners, the perpetrators, the 
products or the profits (I refer to these as the 4 Ps of transnational crime) cross borders.9   
 
Illicit international trafficking in forest products10 
The transnational trade in illegally logged timber – described by one observer as being of 
‘industrial scale’11 – is a significant component of what is an otherwise legal, although often 
unsustainable global industry. Illegal logging, which takes place in some of the world’s most 
vulnerable forests, is an umbrella term for a range of activities: extraction crimes such as logging 
without a licence or logging inside protected areas or national parks; transportation crimes 
involving the smuggling across borders of illegally logged (or stolen) timber and timber products, 
or timber species that are protected from trade under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES); and processing crimes such as the fraudulent labeling of timber 
destined for export (timber laundering). It is a major driver of deforestation, habitat destruction, 
and species endangerment and is often accompanied by abuse of human rights, violence, and 
social and cultural dislocation for forest dwelling and forest-reliant communities.  
 While not all illegally logged timber is destined for transnational trade, there is almost 
certainly a close relationship between the extent of illegal logging and the extent of timber 
trafficking. Illegal logging is reported to account for 50 to 90 percent (by volume) of forest 
                                                 
7 Green et al, ‘Logging and legality’, p. 94.  
8 The Convention’s focus on organized crime (groups that are structured rather than randomly formed)  and on 
serious crime attracting four years or more deprivation of liberty in domestic law can, however, narrow the scope 
and range of what is understood as a crime or as criminality in the global forest sector.  
9 Under the UN TOC Convention, the activity must be recognized as a criminal offense in at least two countries as a 
result of international or national law 
10 This is the phrase used by ECOSOC and the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (under 
the auspices of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime); see, for example, ECOSOC Resolution 2008/25. 
11 Sam Lawson, (2004) Profiting from plunder: how Malaysia smuggles endangered wood (London/Bogor: Environmental 
Investigation Agency/Telapak), p. 1. 
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output in tropical producer countries, and between 15 and 30 percent of global output.12 In 
Indonesia, for example, where at its height something between 51 percent and 80 percent of 
timber cut was thought to be illegally logged,13 estimates suggest that the equivalent of 300,000 
million cubic metres of illegally harvested timber is smuggled out of the country each month.14  
 The illegal timber trade is also sustained by the ease of commodity displacement with 
loggers and traffickers turning to new and more profitable timber species – or to manufactured 
products – as other species attract (unevenly implemented) protection status under international 
or domestic law. This form of TEC is driven in part by a market for cheap timber and timber 
products. But the trade also reflects demand for high value species. 500 rosewood logs seized by 
Thai Customs in August 2010 were estimated to be worth $US 1.5 million had they reached their 
intended Chinese market.15  Illegally sourced mahogany can fetch more than US$1,700 a cubic 
metre.16 The market might generate profit for timber traffickers but it is costly for governments 
and for legitimate industry. The World Bank conservatively estimates the cost to timber-
producing countries in lost government revenue at about $US5 billion a year.17 The trade in 
illegally logged timber depresses world timber prices by something between 7 and 16 percent 
because the companies and agents involved pay no taxes, fees or other forms of licence and use 
cheap and often vulnerable sources of labour.18  
 
Forest governance and legality verification 
The 2008 report of the G8 forest experts agreed that tackling illegal logging and its associated 
trade requires combating corruption, strengthening enforcement capacity, re-establishing law 
enforcement and administrative systems in post-conflict situations, helping countries to meet 
CITES obligations, and enhancing cooperation between customs and law enforcement 
authorities in producer and consumer countries.19 The Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive 
Strategies for Global Challenges, adopted at the 12th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice in 2010, recognized emerging forms of crime such as illegal logging that have a 
                                                 
12 C. Nellemann, , I. Redmond and J. Refisch (2010) The last stand of the gorilla: environmental crime and conflict in the Congo 
basin (Norway: UNEP GRID:Arendal), p. 6. 
13 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (2010) The globalization of crime: a transnational organized crime threat 
assessment (Vienna: UNODC), p. 167.  
14 WWF (n.d.) Country Profile: Indonesia,  
http://gftn.panda.org/gftn_worldwide/asia/indonesia_ftn/indonesia_profile/;  accessed 17 July 2012 
15 Enviromental Investigation Agency (2012) Rosewood robbery (London: EIA), p. 3. 
16 Julia M. Urrunaga, Andrea Johnson, Inés Dhaynee Orbegozo and Fiona Mulligan (2012) The laundering machine: how 
fraud and corruption in Peru’s concession system are destroying the future of its forests (Washington DC: Environmental 
Investigation Agency), p. 3. 
17 World Bank (2006) ‘Weak forest governance costs $US 15 billion a year’, Press Release No. 2007/86/SDN. 16 
September 
18 See Anon (2006) ‘Down in the woods’, The Economist 25 March: 73-5 at p. 74. 
19 The G8 Forest Experts’ Report on Illegal Logging, May 2008, pp. 9-11.  
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significant impact on the environment and called on member states to ‘strengthen their national 
crime prevention and criminal justice legislation’ in response.  
One of the challenges for governments in meeting these expectations and dealing with 
timber trafficking is finding the right regulatory mix across prevention, detection, apprehension, 
and prosecution. This is likely to involve the use of economic incentives, command-and-control 
strategies and law enforcement practices to contain relationships of exchange along illegal chains 
of custody and restrict both supply-side and demand-side activity. The challenges of illegal 
logging and associated trade are complex. They flourish in situations of weak governance and 
regulation, imperfect or poorly protected property rights, and inadequate legal frameworks for 
defining the boundaries of legality and illegality.20 Put broadly, illegal logging and associated trade 
reflect failures in forest governance. Weak forest governance is characterized by corruption, 
inadequate or ineffective legal frameworks, and narrow and exclusive decision-making 
procedures with little or no transparency or accountability. FAO and the World Bank’s Program 
on Forests (PROFOR) define the major elements of ‘good’ forest governance to include 
accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, fairness/equity, participation and transparency across 
three pillars: policy, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks; planning and decision-making 
processes; and implementation, enforcement and compliance.21  
Measures are required at both the producer and consumer level – to protect forests from 
illegal logging and to ensure that timber products that reach the market are or can be certified as 
legal (and, often, as from sustainably managed forests). Legality verification has been one strategy 
by which governments have sought to meet forest governance challenges. The heart of LV lies in 
the elaboration of due diligence processes by which suppliers can ensure the legal status of raw 
materials used in the timber and forest products industries. This demands verification of both 
legal origin and legal compliance to provide markets with ‘independent information about the 
origin of timber’.22 Suppliers are expected to maintain documented chain of custody systems and 
to adopt strategies to enable them to evaluate the risk that illegally logged or sourced timber has 
been included in the supply chain. Forest managers, suppliers, and other entities involved in all 
stages of a supply chain need to participate if legality verification is to work effectively. 
According to NEPCon’s standard legality verification scheme, for material to be determined not 
to be associated with illegal activities, it must:  
                                                 
20 See, for example, Ludgarde Coppens (2013) Transnational environmental crime: a common crime in need of better enforcement, 
UNEP Global Environmental Alert Service (GEAS), January.  
21 See FAO (2011) Framework for assessing and monitoring forest governance (Rome: FAO/PROFOR).  
22 Verifor (2009) Meeting the challenges of timber legality verification (London: Verifor/FAO), p. 3.  
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• originate from a forest that has been harvested according to applicable [national] 
legislation 
• be transported, traded, and handled legally in the supply chain; and 
• not be mixed with other material of illegal [or uncertain] origin.23 
As well as avoiding timber that is illegally harvested, legal supply chains must also exclude 
conflict timber (timber extraction that funds groups involved in conflict situations associated 
with human rights abuses or crimes that violate international law including international 
humanitarian law). They must also exclude timber from countries that are the subject of 
international sanctions, and timber that is logged in ways that violate third party rights including 
those of forest-dwellers and local communities. Procedures that must be verified legal along the 
supply chain include declaration of species and quantity of timber products for customs, 
classification and reporting for appropriate fees and taxes, and the separation of certified timber 
from products of unknown or suspicious origin at all stages of transport and trade.  
 Tracking systems for tracing chains of custody are crucial to legality verification.24 But 
they are auditing not enforcement strategies. They are necessary but not sufficient in the fight 
against illegal logging and timber trafficking. While they can play a ‘significant role’ in addressing 
the ‘deep-seated problems of forest governance’, relying on LV alone will fail ‘because it does 
not address the underlying weaknesses that lead to illegality’.25 Nor, in many cases, do domestic 
legality definitions and practices address fundamental problems associated with illegal chains of 
custody and cross-border trade. Investigations into the illegal log trade between Laos and 
Vietnam, for example, have revealed that the Certificate of Origin documents identifying Laos as 
the country of origin and China as the country of import – documents that would be a required 
component of an effective LV scheme – were issued not by Laotian authorities but by the 
Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry on the basis of unilateral validation.26 
 In contrast to the single-instrument approach, the so-called portfolio approach to forest 
governance and the elimination of or reduction in illegal logging and illegal supply anticipates a 
combination of instruments that (among other things) involve certification, verification, capacity 
building, and voluntary partnership agreements. However this regulatory mix – which captures 
policy instruments at a domestic level – is only one component of the ‘systems of [authoritative] 
                                                 
23 NEPCon Legal Source Standard, Version 1, 8 February 2013, p. 13 
24 Donovan identifies this as only one component of legality verification, and one that is not necessarily included in 
all verification initiatives (see Donovan, Private sector forest legality initiatives, p. 14).  
25 Verifor, Meeting the challenge, p. 10.  
26 Environmental Investigation Agency, Comments on Draft 6 of the “Timber and Timber Product Legality 
Definition for the Voluntary Partnership Agreement”, issued in December 2012 by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; available at http://www.eia-international.org/eia-
comments-on-the-6th-draft-of-the-vietnamese-timber-and-timber-product-legality-definition 
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rule-making, political coordination and problem-solving’27 that constitute and define the reach of 
transnational environmental governance. For the most part, these function as the first of the 
three FAO pillars referred to above, collectively the policy, legal, institutional and regulatory 
frameworks. The focus on governance, legality and verification pays little attention to criminal 
practices and behavior, to the illicit forest economy and illegal transnational chains of custody, or 
to the role of law enforcement agencies in suppressing, detecting and preventing forest-related 
crimes and illegal activities. LV standards and practices are unlikely to be able to address 
indiscriminate markets and criminal activity in the forest sector. The Indonesian environmental 
NGO WALHI claims that the ‘technical focus on “illegal logging” of the kind that characterizes 
LV fails to target the real criminals, those behind the operations’.28 They argue that it does little 
more than ‘legitimise the current system’ which perpetuates deals, perks and the exchange of 
large payments to officials and political figures.29 More attention is therefore demanded of the 
areas where ‘criminal law can intervene to protect the environment’.30  
 
Black trade, criminality and forest law enforcement 
The trade in illegally sourced raw timber and forest products has been clearly identified in law 
enforcement circles as a form of transnational crime. The chains of custody through which 
illegally-sourced or produced commodities are physically sourced and then moved to their 
destination can be understood as a form of network. The nodes in the network are designed to 
manage illicit trade flows. The links between the nodes consist of relationships of (illegal) 
commercial exchange. Some timber trafficking chains are simple, even amateur or opportunistic 
attempts that involve a small number of people, uncomplicated smuggling routes, and 
unsophisticated forms of concealment. The market networks that underpin or manage the 
movement of large quantities of illegally sourced timber are likely to involve multiple sources of 
goods, multiple participants in the chain of custody, and the use of sophisticated methods to 
conceal either the goods or their true nature or origin. To make detection more difficult, stolen 
timber is often moved along complex routes through more than one trans-shipment point where 
enforcement is lax and where goods can easily be mixed with legal sources, relabeled or acquire 
fraudulent documentation before being moved on. 
                                                 
27 James N. Rosenau (2002) ‘Governance in a new global order’ in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds) Governing 
globalization: power, authority and global governance (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 8 
28 Cited in Chantal Marijnissen, Saskia Ozinga, Beatrix Richards and Sebastien Risso (2004) Facing reality: how to halt 
the import of illegal timber in the EU (Brussels: FERN/Greenpeace/WWF), p. 8. 
29 See Marcus Colchester (2005) ‘Illegal timber in Indonesia: experiments with legal verification’, WRM Bulletin, no. 
98, September; http://www.wrm.org.ut/bulletin/98/Indonesia.html 
30 Coppens, Transnational environmental crime, p. 5.  
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 Local communities who provide labour for illegal logging and timber processing are 
often integrated into criminal networks through patron-client relationships. This may involve 
semi-feudal connections to local timber barons or local officials who control aspects of criminal 
activity. These relationships can also arise through social coercion that takes advantage of 
people’s economic vulnerability in situations where alternative livelihoods are not available. Local 
communities are sometimes also ‘bought off’ to minimize protests in areas where resource 
extraction is known to be illegal.31 Transnational environmental crime also creates opportunity 
structures for legal companies to engage in shadow enterprise and for front or shell companies 
to be used to hide illegal connections and practices. This arises because, in contrast to drugs for 
example, illegal timber trade sits alongside a legal one. Black markets, according to Naylor, have 
become ‘institutionally embedded in the legal economy’32 and, in some sectors at least, legal 
businesses use ‘ever shadier methods’.33 Timber, timber commodities and profits are laundered 
with the assistance of delinquent professionals and ‘shadow facilitators’.34 Environmental goods 
and resources are moved in and out of the licit economy through the use of counterfeit or 
falsified documentation. Legitimate companies process fraudulent permits and lend their 
infrastructure to facilitate transportation in illegal timber.  
Intelligence on merbau smuggling syndicates in Southeast Asia shows that they involve 
timber brokers in Jakarta, companies and individuals in Malaysia who oversee the actual logging, 
companies in Singapore who charter cargo vessels and who arrange false documentation, brokers 
in Singapore and Hong Kong who connect sellers in places such as Papua with buyers in India 
and China.35 Timber logged illegally in the Congo Basin, most often under the control of militia 
groups, is moved through local front companies to companies in and through Burundi, Rwanda 
and Uganda, exported globally to the EU, the Middle East, China and other Asian countries, 
with support from financiers in the US.36  
 Those engaged in illicit TEC market activity have also moved to take advantage of the 
‘upperworld’ of corrupt officials and politicians, enabling them to evade control mechanisms and 
protect illegal chains of custody. The correlation between high levels of corruption and illegal 
                                                 
31 See, for example, the case studies of Cameroon in Danielle Van Oijen and Sylvain Angerand (2007) Illegally logged 
wood from Cameroon on the Dutch market (Amsterdam/Paris: Milieudefensie/Les Amis de la Terre). 
32 R. T. Naylor (2002) Wages of crime: black markets, illegal finance and the underworld economy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press), p. 3. 
33 Naylor, Wages of crime, p. 4. 
34 Douglas Farah (2010) Transnational crime, social networks and forests: using natural resources to finance conflicts and post-conflict 
violence (Washington DC: Program on Forests [PROFOR]) 
35 Julian Newman and Sam Lawson (2005) The last frontier: illegal logging in Papua and China’s massive timber theft 
(London/Bogor: Telapak/Environmental Investigation Agency), p. 9. 
36 Nellemann et al, The last stand, p. 6. 
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logging is well documented.37 Indeed, some commentators suggest that corruption should best 
be understood not as a pathology of the state but simply as an instrument of risk management – 
a strategy for doing business – for criminal groups.38 Local officials, customs officers, police and 
the judiciary are bribed to overlook illegal shipments, to assist with false paper trails and forged 
documentation, to help evidence disappear during prosecutions, to delay or drop prosecutions, 
and even to return no convictions when cases are brought to trial. Syndicates running timber 
smuggling enterprises in Indonesia, for example, have “bought off local Indonesian customs 
officials and harbour masters” and used their influence to “have any attempted shipments by 
competitors stopped”.39  
In their most extensive form, timber trafficking networks integrate criminal actors fully 
into the economic and political institutions of the state, often delivering them significant power 
and even, Serrano suggests, consolidating “exclusive governing authority”.40 Rather than being 
just the recipients of bribes, government officials, protection and enforcement officers, and 
politicians can take key roles as the organizers, facilitators and beneficiaries of illicit market 
networks. Police and military officers are known to be heavily involved in organizing and 
coordinating illegal logging in a number of countries in Southeast Asia or providing security for 
logging operations.41 As with other forms of systematic criminal activity, this bribery and 
corruption undermines attempts to instill good governance. They corrode the institutions of the 
state and compromise core values such as the rule of law. In the most extreme cases of high-
level corruption and personal patronage, the state itself no longer functions in the Weberian 
sense as a provider and guarantor of public goods but as a ‘protection racket’ or kleptocracy that 
sustains private appropriation, resource ‘asset stripping’ and rent-seeking. 
 Disrupting the criminal networks that sustain the illegal timber trade, even those that are 
informal and opportunistic, is difficult. The most sophisticated smuggling networks in the illegal 
timber trade are often better resourced than law enforcement and border control agencies. While 
laws are expected to function on the basis of deterrence – ‘the inhibition of criminal behavior by 
                                                 
37 See, for example, NEPCon Legal Source Standard, version 1, 8 February 2013; Christian Nellerman/Interpol 
Environmental Crime Program (eds) 2012, Green carbon, black trade: illegal logging, tax fraud and laundering in the world’s 
tropical forests, A rapid response assessment (Norway: UNEP, GRID-Arendal).  
38 Phil Williams (2002) ‘Transnational organized crime and the state’ in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker 
(eds) The emergence of private authority in global governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 174-5. 
39 Lawson, Profiting from plunder, p. 13. 
40 Monicá Serrano (2002) ‘Transnational organised crime and international security: business as usual?’ in Mats 
Berdal and Monicá Serrano (eds) Transnational organised crime and international security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), p. 18. 
41 Rivani Noor and Rully Syumanda (2006) Social conflict and environmental disaster: a report on Asia Pulp and Paper’s 
operations in Sumatra, Indonesia (Moreton-in-Marsh, UK: World Rainforest Movement); Marilyne Pereira Goncalves, 
Melissa Panjer, Theodore S. Greenberg and William B. Magrath (2012) Justice for forests: improving criminal justice efforts to 
combat illegal logging (Washington DC: The World Bank). 
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fear of the consequences (sanctions or penalties)’42 – penalties are often minimal. Intelligence on 
activities that sustain the black timber trade is often limited compared with what is known about 
other illicit markets such as drugs or arms. Inter-agency arrangements for exchange of 
information, for managing joint operations or providing mutual legal and enforcement assistance 
are often uneven within countries let alone between them. Enforcement and border protection 
agencies require operational support to interdict illegal trade, seize goods, pursue and punish 
perpetrators, and use surveillance of corruption, fraud and money-laundering to gather and act 
on financial intelligence. 
  
Third parties and agency beyond the state43 
Legality verification and enforcement are assumed to be the responsibility of the state (or states 
acting intergovernmentally). Judgements about what is ‘legal’ – for both commodities and actions 
– are caught up in definitions and decisions about what is not legal and what is criminal. 
Sovereign states claim and seek to retain individual and collective authority over the making and 
implementation of rules on trade, crime prevention, enforcement and border protection.  States 
– or governments, in practice – are central to the form and function of relevant treaty law as 
negotiators and as allegedly responsible implementers of that law through domestic legislation 
and regulation. Yet the involvement of organized criminal groups brings the monopoly claims of 
the sovereign state into conflict with the shadow area of illegality that functions beyond or as a 
challenge to sovereign space and authority. Weak states, and those characterized by ‘socio-
economic destitution’, are more likely to offer the kinds of ‘commercial opportunities’ that 
attract criminal groups.44 At the same time, efforts to control borders and to reassert the role of 
the state in the face of both licit and illicit market liberalization can have the unintended 
consequence of encouraging criminal groups to develop more innovative concealment and 
avoidance strategies. 
 In the terrain of transnational environmental governance, agency for legality verification 
and for enforcement has become more complex. NGOs and various forms of enforcement and 
intelligence networks have an increasingly important role in verifying not just what is legal in 
accordance with regulatory standards but also in exposing what is ‘illegal’ and ‘criminal’ or what 
                                                 
42 Verifor, Meeting the challenge, p. 6.  
43 The concept of agency beyond the state, in the context of transnational environmental crime including illegal 
logging and timber trafficking, also includes the ‘dark side’ of such agency embedded in criminal actors and illicit 
market networks.  Actors involved in the commission of transnational environmental crime are also in the business 
of purposefully violating or subverting the rule systems of global environmental governance and avoiding or 
neutralizing regulatory or surveillance schemes by which they are implemented. 
44 Achim Wennmann (2004) ‘The political economy of transnational crime and its implications for armed violence in 
Georgia’, CP 6: The Illusions of Transition: which perspectives for Central Asia and the Caucasus (Geneva: Graduate Institute 
of International Studies/CIMERA), p. 105. 
   
12 
 
should be defined as such. The concept of agency beyond the state captures the proposition that 
non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society organisations do more than protest, advocate, 
lobby and advise.45 Rather in some circumstances – and forest illegality and crime is one such 
area – they have become rule-makers, establishing what Bull et al refer to as non-coercive 
mechanisms of influence.46 These can take the form of constitutive rules that define a regime, 
regulative rules that focus on procedures, voluntary rules and standards, and codes of conduct 
articulated through private regulation, certification and accreditation. 
The background of NGO involvement in forest governance – that is the regulatory side 
of the equation – is well known. As Donovan notes, organisations in the private (non-public) 
sector have taken various leadership roles as independent auditors, sometimes providing ‘direct 
fee-for-service to forest product manufacturers, traders or forest managers’ and sometimes 
‘contracted by governments or foreign aid organisations in implementing government legality 
registration or monitoring systems’.47 Many of the leading efforts to improve sustainable forest 
management through monitoring, certification and the implementation of market-based 
mechanisms have been the result of NGO initiatives, sometimes acting alone and sometimes in 
partnership with industry groups and sometimes with governments. Private sector/NGO 
initiatives in the forest governance arena include the Forest Stewardship Council, the Global 
Forest and Trade Network, and the Tropical Forest Trust.  
 In response to the black trade in timber and forest products (as in other areas of 
transnational environmental crime), non-state actors have also become active in rule 
implementation and compliance – or what Biersteker and Hall call the ‘enforcement of 
contracts’.48 This might take the form of an inspectorate role and the assessment of compliance, 
delivering capacity-building and training, or publicising examples of non-compliance. But it can 
also take the form of intelligence, surveillance, and even operational activities.  
In the transnational space, nongovernmental organizations and scientific bodies have 
become an increasingly important component of the networked and multi-level architecture that 
characterizes transnational environmental governance, often as key partners in formal 
arrangements and active participants in informal arrangements. The wildlife monitoring NGO 
TRAFFIC is a formal partner with CITES under a MoU adopted in 1999 to strengthen capacity 
                                                 
45 See Frank Biermann et al (2010) ‘Earth system governance: a research framework’, International Environmental 
Agreements, 10 (4) 277-98 at pp. 282-4. 
46 Benedicte Bull, Morten Bøås and and Desmond McNeill (2004) Private sector influence in the multilateral system: 
a changing structure of world governance?, Global Governance, 10 (xx): 481-98 at p. 493 
47 Richard Z. Donovan (2010) Private sector forest legality initiatives as a complement to public action, (Richmond: Rainforest 
Alliance), p. 3.   
48 Thomas J. Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (2002) ‘Private authority as global governance’ in Thomas J. 
Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (eds) The emergence of private authority in global governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 203.  
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building, communication and liaison among member states. This relationship now includes 
TRAFFIC acting as a mandated collection point for data from Parties (on the killing of elephants 
for example) and a formal requirement for TRAFFIC to report its analysis to each CITES 
Conference of Parties. NGOs are partners with governments and international organizations in 
so-called ‘Track II’ arrangements that address various aspects of forest crime and illegal trade, 
such as the Asia Regional Partners' Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (ARPEC) and 
the International Network on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE).  
The dependence on private as well as public spheres of action, and the frequent blurring 
of the two, is also reflected in the extent of undercover and intelligence gathering operations 
undertaken equally by key NGOs as by national and international enforcement and policing 
agencies such as Interpol and the World Customs Organisation. NGOs such as the 
Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), TRAFFIC and the Wildlife Conservation Society 
(WCS) have developed extensive capacity and expertise in undercover investigation and 
intelligence gathering. The EIA describes its own work as involving ‘[d]iligent, carefully planned 
undercover investigations’ that generate ‘credible intelligence and persuasive imagery’.49 This 
includes ‘setting up false front companies and well-researched fake identities … to infiltrate 
potentially criminal organisations’.  
 
The challenges of agency beyond the state 
Agency for transnational forest governance and transnational forest law enforcement spans the 
boundary between environmental protection, in which non-state agency is increasingly accepted, 
and the making and implementation of rules on crime prevention, enforcement and border 
protection over which sovereign states claim and seek to retain individual and collective 
authority. The involvement of NGOs in regulatory and governance arrangements such as legality 
verification raises questions about independence, autonomy and state sovereignty. Those 
questions become even more important when agency beyond the state is extended into the realm 
of compliance and enforcement. As Green et al note, the use of surveillance and undercover 
techniques – more often associated with national and transnational crime enforcement agencies 
– raises questions about the legitimacy and authority of non-state actors whose actions are not 
specifically sanctioned by law or regulation.50 Those issues are explored briefly in this final 
section.  
                                                 
49 See http://www.eia-international.org/about-eia; accessed 25 March 2013; see also 
http://science.time.com/2012/04/09/indonesia-punishes-wildlife-traffickers/;  
50 Green et al, ‘Logging and legality’, p. 100.  
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 In simple terms, transnational environmental crime in general and timber trafficking in 
particular could be understood as a problem of the kind of regulatory failure that occurs when 
there is insufficient regulation, or when regulatory systems are based on outdated or insufficient 
knowledge, or when domestic agencies ‘inadequately fulfill their oversight, supervisory and 
enforcement functions’.51 Yet there is little agreement on whether LV is best undertaken by 
independent agencies or whether the involvement of non-state actors is a stepping stone to 
greater involvement of the public sector as procedures improve and as capacity and expertise 
grows. NGOs may function independently of the state in their monitoring and verification role. 
They may also act on behalf of the state. Private or non-state actors can help to give credibility to 
standards. Given that timber trafficking and other forms of environmental crime are serious 
crimes that are often not taken seriously by governments, with enforcement in particular usually 
vastly underfunded, there is a danger though that NGO capacity and expertise becomes a 
substitute for state action rather than a driver of it. Government actors themselves may come to 
rely on intelligence gathered through NGO undercover actions. EIA investigators report being 
asked by Indonesian forest officials to conduct further investigations because they (the officials) 
needed more information that there were apparently unable or unwilling to pursue themselves.52  
 Non-state actors can also face challenges in balancing externally-mandated inspectorate 
or monitoring responsibilities and their own missions that focus on exposure and enforcement. 
This is particularly so in situations where the former relies on improving compliance with 
existing rules and regulatory structures and the latter involves challenging and exposing the 
limitations of the same rules and regulations. Global Witness, for example, has worked to expose 
corruption in the forestry sectors in countries such as Cambodia (from which it was 
subsequently banned) and Malaysia at the same time as it has been funded by the UK 
government agency DFID (Department for International Development) to work with local 
NGOs in a number of forest-producing countries to improve transparency and monitoring with 
the explicit goal of driving national and international advocacy to ‘demand accountability and 
improve policy and practice across the forestry sector’.53  
The state’s sovereign claims to ‘exclusive competence’ over forest governance, as over 
environmental governance more generally, are being re-envisioned by transnational challenges 
                                                 
51 Daniel Kaufmann and Veronika Penciakova (2011) Preventing nuclear meltdown: assessing regulatory failure in Japan and 
the United States, Opinion (1 April), Brookings Institution; 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/04/01-nuclear-meltdown-kaufmann 
52 See http://www.eia-international.org/wb_15_forests; in other areas of transnational environmental crime – such 
as wildlife crime – NGO representatives report being present at official interviews of crime suspects (see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/world/asia/notorious-figure-in-animal-smuggling-beyond-reach-in-
laos.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) 
53 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Work-with-us/Funding-opportunities/Not-for-profit-organisations/Governance-
and-Transparency-Fund/GTF-programmes/Global-Witness-led-GTF-programme/ 
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and by the nature of agency beyond the state. For Karkkainen, this constitutes more than a 
constraint on the exercise of state sovereignty. Rather it implies the ‘partial disaggregation or 
unbundling and reassignment of powers traditionally thought to be among sovereignty’s most 
essential attributes’.54 There is, as a result, no clarity on whether the involvement of NGOs in 
forest regulation, governance and enforcement is a challenge to sovereignty, a function of weak 
sovereignty, or whether it can actually serve to strengthen state capacity. To some extent, the 
involvement of NGOs can be seen as a response to the inadequacies and incapacities of the 
state, with NGOs filling the gaps in environmental/forest sector governance where states have 
been unwilling or unable to do so. However, agents beyond the state do more than ‘assist’ the 
state, or attempt to influence state policy, or step in when state capacity is found wanting. Rather 
this agency also exists as a sphere of politics and authority independent of the sovereign statei or 
what Rosenau refers to as ‘sovereignty-free’ zone.55 The involvement of NGOs in both 
regulation and enforcement in the global forest sector can also be understood as a countervailing 
force, a ‘disciplining of state agencies’56 or what Tinker refers to as a ‘check and balance on 
unbridled state sovereignty’57 of the kind that arises when agents of the state are complicit in the 
very issues and challenges – such as illegal logging and associated trade – that they purport to be 
attempting to solve.  
54 Bradley C. Karkkainen (2004) “Post-sovereign environmental governance”, Global Environmental Politics 4 (1): 72-96 
at p. 77 
55 James Rosenau (1990) Turbulence in world politics: a theory of change and continuity, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
56 Green et al, ‘Logging and legality’, p. 100.  
57 Catherine J. Tinker (1993) 'NGOs and environmental policy: who represents global civil society?', paper presented 
to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, p.14. 
